Two Degrees of Intentionality: Approaching the Ascription of Psychological Content in Non-Linguistic Creatures by Ferreira, Michael Joseph
University of Missouri, St. Louis
IRL @ UMSL
Theses Graduate Works
7-14-2006
Two Degrees of Intentionality: Approaching the
Ascription of Psychological Content in Non-
Linguistic Creatures
Michael Joseph Ferreira
University of Missouri-St. Louis, ferreira.23@osu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://irl.umsl.edu/thesis
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Works at IRL @ UMSL. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses by an
authorized administrator of IRL @ UMSL. For more information, please contact marvinh@umsl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ferreira, Michael Joseph, "Two Degrees of Intentionality: Approaching the Ascription of Psychological Content in Non-Linguistic
Creatures" (2006). Theses. 265.
http://irl.umsl.edu/thesis/265
 TWO DEGREES OF INTENTIONALITY:  APPROACHING THE ASCRIPTION OF 
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTENT IN NON-LINGUISTIC CREATURES 
 
by 
 
MICHAEL JOSEPH FERREIRA 
B.A., Philosophy, University of San Francisco, 1999 
 
 
A THESIS 
 
Submitted to the Graduate School of the 
 
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI – ST. LOUIS 
 
In partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree 
 
MASTER OF ARTS 
 
in  
 
PHILOSOPHY 
 
July, 2006 
 
Advisory Committee 
 
 
Gualtiero Piccinini, Ph.D. 
Committee Chair 
 
 Robert Gordon, Ph.D. 
 
Stephanie Ross, Ph.D. 
 
 
© Copyright 2006 
by 
Michael Joseph Ferreira 
All Rights Reserved 
Ferreira, Michael, 2006, UMSL, p. 2
ABSTRACT 
 
We often include intentional (psychological) states in the explanation of complex non-
human animal behavior.  How, if possible, should we characterize intentionality in other 
species without trivializing our own?  I aim to develop a strategy, compatible with 
intentional realism, for approaching the ascription of intentionality in non-linguistic 
species.  One way to approach the question, one rehearsed in multiple contexts, is to 
question the conditions under which conceptual mental representations might obtain in 
non-linguistic species.  I follow a similar, but less developed strategy.  I argue, following 
some recent literature, that it is likely that concepts split into (at least) two kinds.  If 
concepts split, and if they split in the appropriate way, then we can argue from 
explanatory necessity and concept splitting that intentionality is not so intimately bound 
up with linguistic competence as some argue.  Finally, I propose that if concepts split in 
the appropriate way, intentionality admits of degrees. 
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Introduction 
     This paper is concerned with what I will refer to throughout as the problem of 
intentional ascription.  The crux of the problem is which creatures and systems merit the 
ascription of intentional mental states.  I aim to develop a strategy for approaching the 
ascription of intentionality and psychological content in non-human, non-linguistic 
species.   
     I am a realist about intentional mental states.  I take it that intentional ascriptions 
frequently apply (certainly in humans), that they capture something real, that what they 
purport to capture is in the world, and that they are subject to philosophical and empirical 
scrutiny.  On this construal, one fundamental aim of intentional ascription is to capture 
mental content for the purposes of psychological explanation.  Moreover, I qualify that, 
in addition to being a realist about intentional content, I am also liberal about 
representation.  At least a moderate liberalism is required of any strategy aimed at 
vindicating psychological explanation for non-linguistic creatures, most or perhaps all of 
which are apparently incapable of realizing full-blown propositional attitudes.   
     In what follows, I will argue that the class of creatures in which concepts obtain does 
not consist only of language users.  I have no ethical agenda.  What I am proposing is that 
psychological explanations often afford or contribute to the best explanation of many 
instances of non-linguistic animal behavior.  I will argue from concept splitting and 
explanatory necessity that intentionality is not a strictly human phenomenon, and also 
that intentionality is not so intimately bound up with linguistic competence as some 
argue.   
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I. The Problem of Intentional Ascription 
 
 
 
1. Disambiguating ‘Intentionality’ 
     To keep allusions to intentionality in multiple contexts from perpetuating confusion, it 
is worth taking a moment to disentangle an inevitable ambiguity.  The following are two 
importantly different senses of intentionality.  On the one hand, actions are said to be 
‘intentional’ when certain conditions are met.  Typically, an action is described as 
intentional if is assumed to be an instance of goal-directed behavior by a willful and 
mindful agent.  On the other hand, the mental content appealed to as part of the 
explanation of this kind of behavior is said to be ‘intentional’ as well.  Typically, some 
states of mind are described as intentional if it is assumed that they are about something, 
if they take some proposition, concept, belief, etc. as an object.  Roughly speaking, this is 
intentionality in Brentano’s sense, where, in a fairly straightforward way, ‘intentional’ 
and ‘mental’ are synonymous.1  When we use intentionality in Brentano’s sense, we 
might alternate freely between ‘intentional content’ and ‘mental content’. 
     In practice, deploying intentional ascriptions in explaining behavior is a common 
sensical affair.  When formulating answers to ‘why’ questions that pertain to the behavior 
of a third party, we are naturally led to conjoin some linguistic expression of a 
proposition with some attitude toward that proposition; hence the familiar ‘propositional 
attitudes’.  The attitudes are the corner stone of folk-psychology, and we typically award 
at least some degree of causal efficacy to the intentional mental states to which the 
attitudes refer.  For the purposes of folk-psychological explanation, the designation 
                                                 
1 Brentano, Franz.  Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, transl. by A.C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell, and 
L. McAlister, London: Routledge, 1973. (2nd ed., intro. by Peter Simons, 1995). 
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‘propositional attitude’ has roughly the same meaning as ‘intentional mental state’.  As 
such, the belief ascriptions deployed in folk-psychological explanations tend naturally to 
be expressed as de dicto ascriptions of intentional mental states.  An ascription is de dicto 
if it attributes a content that is at least approximately captured by some dictum, some 
proposition expressible in a language.  For our purposes, this is just to say that when 
explaining behavior, we are naturally led to map some dictum-plus-attitude onto any 
subject exhibiting behavior that is prima facie purposive.   
     Fortunately, for present purposes, we needn’t be concerned with metaphysical, 
syntactic, or semantic modality (i.e. de dicto versus de re).  The relevant point is just that 
when attributing intentional (psychological) states with the aim of explaining behavior, 
we frequently resort to de dicto ascriptions.  The fact that it is intuitively difficult to 
understand how we might otherwise characterize intentional mental states (i.e. in the 
absence of language) motivates well argued answers to the problem of intentional 
ascription.  We will look at one answer, which I take to be inadequate, in more detail 
below. 
     For now simply note that we would say, for instance, that Jones bends to drink from 
the stream because he believes that the water is potable and he desires that his thirst be 
quenched.  We would say that Smith studies furiously until dawn because he wants to do 
well on his anthropology exam and he believes that he is not up to speed on his 
phylogeny.  In both cases we’ve conjoined a proposition (i.e. that the water is potable) 
with an attitude orienting the subject towards that proposition (i.e. believes).  We 
frequently attempt to characterize the intentional states of the subjects in these and other 
everyday sorts of contexts with de dicto ascriptions of psychological states.  In effect, de 
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dicto ascriptions are presented as answers to ‘why’ questions regarding a subject’s 
behavior.  Our brief examples, given above, can be considered more or less typical in this 
regard.   
 
(A)  Why does Jones bend to drink from the stream?  Because (we hypothesize)… 
 (A1)  Jones believes that the water is potable. 
 (A2)  Jones believes that it is a good time to drink water. 
 
(B)  Why does Smith stay up all night studying?  Because (we hypothesize)… 
 (B1)  Smith believes that he needs to study his phylogeny. 
 
(B2)  Smith believes that studying will help him on his test. 
 
     Note that folk-psychological explanations map such dictum-plus-attitude conjunctions 
onto a hypothesized mental state in an attempt to capture some presumably causally 
efficacious mental content.  So, the important assumptions are that intentional mental 
states have content, and that capturing mental content can contribute substantially to 
explanations of behavior.  It just is the business of psychology, at this level of abstraction, 
to explain behavior by pointing to what many philosophers call intentional content, and to 
relations among intentional contents ‘in the mind’ of a subject. 
 
1.1 
     Here I’ll pose some questions in order to frame the problem I aim to address.  In the 
ordinary sense of intentionality, actions are said to be intentional only if they are directed 
toward some goal by a conscious, willing agent.  Why does Jones drink from the stream?  
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We frequently accept explanations of the form: Jones exhibits behavior B because he 
believes X and desires Y.  But, again, what do these kinds of so-called psychological 
explanations rely upon for their meaning and how widely applicable are they?  Consider 
that Kanzi, the bonobo, frequently exhibits water-drinking behavior himself.  Does he 
drink because he, too, believes X and desires Y?  The problem immediately surfaces: are 
we free to deploy an intentional explanation in Jones’ case and in Kanzi’s?  If not, why 
not?  If so, how can we make sense of the marked differences in behavioral flexibility 
exhibited by Jones and Kanzi?  How far can we extend our application of intentional 
explanation without making it, at best instrumental, at worst trivial? 
     One natural reply is that Jones is a language user, we can ask him why he Bs and 
confirm the veracity of our explanation.  But I take this reply to be question begging.  
The question is what really licenses the ascription of intentionality in one case and not 
the other?  It cannot be just the fact that Jones can speak (or that we think he can speak) 
that makes his behavior explainable in the language of folk-psychology.  Maybe we are 
never in a position to interrogate Jones.  We may never hear Jones utter a sentence.  If we 
assume that he is a language user, we are likely to assume that he has thoughts, concepts, 
beliefs, and realizes a variety of intentional mental states.  The question is whether Jones 
really does have mental states.  Are we merely speaking metaphorically when we ascribe 
intentional content to Kanzi and Jones?  Are we merely speaking metaphorically in all 
cases of intentional ascription?   
      The concern generated by the ordinary use is rooted in the fact that prima facie 
intentional behavior is exhibited at all levels of biological organization and even in some 
inorganic systems.  But which creatures and systems behave intentionally in the relevant 
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sense, the sense which would require positing psychological phenomena to explain?  I 
assume that this question can only be answered after we answer the question of which 
creatures harbor intentional content.  This is one construal of the problem of intentional 
ascription.   
     We need to focus our attention on Brentano’s sense of intentionality: that of 
representational mental content.  So for now, to abet confusion, I will simply stipulate 
that we are concerned primarily with intentionality in Brentano’s sense.  Also, in order to 
further focus the issue, intentional ascriptions are viable components of psychological 
explanation if and only if they capture intentional (representational) content.2  That is, 
where there is no representational content, psychological explanation does not really 
apply.3  
     If the preceding bi-conditional sounds suspiciously tautologous, note that there are 
popular strategies for explaining behavior that do not rely on any account of mental 
content.  Daniel Dennett, for one, has suggested that understanding behavior by appealing 
to psychological explanation is perfectly acceptable, regardless of whether intentional 
content is real.4  In this sense, Dennett is instrumentalist about intentional mental states.  
Paul and Patricia Churchland have suggested that folk-psychology is simply false.5  The 
theoretical postulates of folk-psychology do not refer.  According to the Churchlands, 
what passes for psychology now will ultimately be eliminated, perhaps by a mature 
                                                 
2 Throughout I will use intentional content, representational content, psychological content, and mental 
content interchangeably. 
3 Of course, this is not to say that no forms of explanation apply.  I mean only to indicate that no viable 
psychological explanation, no explanation of the kind traditionally forwarded in the idiom of folk-
psychology, appealing to beliefs, desires, intentions, etc.  My assumption here is that, while the vocabulary 
of folk-psychology might be subject to radical revisions, beliefs and desires, along with whatever mental 
and conceptual structures constitute them, really do exist and are causally efficacious. 
4 Dennett, Daniel.  The Intentional Stance.  Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.  1987. 
5 Churchland, P.M. ‘Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes’.  Journal of Philosophy. 78: 
67-90.  1981. 
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neuroscience. Stephen Stich, too, has motivated eliminativism about the psychological 
attitudes, but on independent grounds.6  Stich questions the notion that beliefs and desires 
really factor into explanations of prima facie intentional behavior.  Evidence generated 
by cognitive psychology indicates that people frequently fail to act in accordance with 
what they claim to believe and desire, and frequently violate rules of elementary logic in 
arriving at beliefs about the world.  Both eliminativist strategies have it that we need not 
concern ourselves with the questions of the reality and individuation of representational 
content.  All three accounts are consistent with psychological explanations being useful, 
even indispensable, heuristic tools.   
     I mention Dennett, the Churchlands, and Stich only in passing here for several 
reasons:  1) to point out that there are several popular strategies to choose from in 
approaching the problem of intentional ascription, 2) to set the stage for my presentation 
of an alternative strategy, and 3) to emphasize that the ontological status of intentional 
content, along with the ontological status of the folk-psychological attitudes, is not a 
trivial point of contention.  Since we are not precluded from giving psychological 
explanations even if the mentalistic vocabulary deployed by philosophers and 
psychologists does not refer, it is not a tautology to say that ascriptions of intentional 
content are viable components of psychological explanation only if they capture 
something real.  If ascriptions of content using mentalistic predicates do refer, then there 
is an important distinction to be drawn between psychological explanations and pseudo-
psychological explanations, where the latter are permitted by varieties of instrumentalism 
and eliminativism.   
                                                 
6 Stich, Stephen.  The Fragmentation of Reason.  Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.  1990. 
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     In a sense, the ontological point goes to the heart of the problem of intentional 
ascription.  I maintain that the question of the reality and character of representational 
(intentional) content is separate from and takes priority over the question of 
understanding intentional behavior.  For, explanations of the latter will include reference 
to relevant kinds of mental representations.  That is, if intentionality is a psychological 
phenomenon, our ability to say anything interesting about which of the many species 
exhibiting purposive behavior warrant intentional ascription relies heavily on our ability 
to develop an adequate, if only programmatic theory of mental content.  I will not offer a 
theory of content here.  Instead, I’d like to suggest that positing degrees of intentionality 
is a promising strategy for distinguishing between intentional and non-intentional 
behavior. 
       In what follows, I assume that the question of which organisms and systems warrant 
intentional ascription is continuous with the question of which organisms and systems 
realize representational (intentional) mental states.  Those creatures that realize 
representational mental states warrant intentional ascription; those that fail to realize 
representational mental states do not.   
     Much of the problem of intentional ascription, we’ll see, is rooted in a pervasive 
equivocation of intentional content with de dicto ascriptions of folk-psychological 
attitudes.  This is just to say that underwriting the problem is the belief that psychological 
explanations are somehow restricted to using the full-blown propositional attitude 
ascriptions deployed in belief-desire explanations of behavior.  This belief partially 
motivates another philosophical strategy for answering the problem of intentional 
ascription.  This strategy has it that mental content is real, causally efficacious, and more 
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or less describable in the language of folk-psychology.  We can call this strategy 
chauvinism, and I’ll explain why in more detail in due course.  Since it is less prone to 
anti-realism, chauvinism is my primary concern, and an important counterpoint to the 
arguments I promote.  Presently, let’s turn our attention to give an account of chauvinism 
about intentional ascription.  What is it, what motivates it, and what is wrong with it? 
 
2. Chauvinism: A Potential Solution to the Problem of Intentional Ascription 
     The chauvinist solution to the problem of which organisms warrant intentional 
ascription is to draw a line across the phylogenetic continuum.  On one side of the line we 
have the class of creatures to which intentional ascription applies.  These creatures appear 
to harbor causally efficacious, contentful mental states.  On the other side of the line we 
have the extension of creatures that do not warrant intentional ascription.  It is 
implausible that these creatures realize contentful mental states, and so it is implausible 
that their behavior is ever explicable in anything resembling the language of folk-
psychology.  The important question for the chauvinist then becomes where to draw their 
line.   
     Those sympathetic to this approach tend to pre-empt the ascription problem before it 
appears to be substantive with an appeal to the logical machinery that underwrites 
language competence.  Intentional ascriptions apply only to linguistic creatures, because 
only linguistic creatures use concepts to characterize features of their worlds.  The 
propositional attitudes are complex intentional mental states largely constituted by the 
concepts a subject possesses and describable in terms of the relationships of the relevant 
concepts to others in a subject’s conceptual scheme.   
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     The chauvinist is quick to point out that if we do not include language among the 
criteria for judging whether a creature warrants intentional ascription, the problem 
appears to be either insurmountable or trivial.  How can we hope, for instance, to 
characterize the mental states of a creature that cannot communicate its beliefs and 
desires even if it has them?  At best, the chauvinist argues, we have pseudo-psychological 
explanations based on non-verbal behavior.  It’s fine to talk about the behavior of non-
linguistic creatures as having intentional states, but they don’t really have them.  This is 
just a version of instrumentalism about intentionality.  Moreover, if all we have to go on 
is non-verbal behavior, we find ourselves rapidly descending a slippery slope, ultimately 
forced to admit that oak trees and earthworms warrant intentional ascription.  In short, the 
chauvinist argues, we do best to make language a prerequisite for intentionality, that way 
we side-step the problem of intentional ascription, at least where language is not present.7   
     Chauvinism presents itself as a plausible, even attractive, alternative to a strong 
behaviorism, instrumentalism, and other varieties of anti-realism about intentionality.  
We should simply conclude that real intentionality requires language competence.  Of 
course earthworms and oak trees don’t have intentional mental states.  Psychological 
explanations, genuine psychological explanations, assume that the subject’s concepts and 
intentional mental states bear appropriate (linguistic/logical) inferential relations to each 
other.  If they do not, then psychological explanation fails.  So, if we’d like to vindicate 
psychology as a science, we do best to admit that intentionality is only realized by 
linguistic creatures.  Chauvinist arguments manifest an unwillingness to take seriously 
                                                 
7 Of course, the issue of whether some artificially intelligent systems capable of interpreting and 
communicating in a language are intentional systems would apparently remain.     
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even the possibility of the attribution of intentionality to creatures incapable of expressing 
themselves verbally.  We need to say more about why they think so. 
 
2.1 
     We can say that one is a chauvinist about intentional ascription if one is arbitrarily 
provincial about intentional content.  One is provincial if one maintains local or restricted 
interests; so, one is provincial about content if one restricts the application of mentalistic 
predicates.  The list of typical mentalistic vocabulary would include, but is certainly not 
limited to, representations, concepts, beliefs and the other attitudes, and, of course, 
intentionality.   
     Of course, any realist account of intentional mental states and psychological attitudes 
will turn out to be provincial to a degree.  After all, we do not want to trivialize mental 
states and we do not want to collapse into a variety of instrumentalism. The point I’ll 
emphasize here is that we also need to beware of how we restrict intentionality, that is, of 
what sort of evidence we use as grounds for the criteria we establish for ascription.    
While a realist account will be provincial about mental content, chauvinism is provincial 
to a fault because the restrictions it entails for applying psychological predicates seem 
arbitrary and inadequate for the explanation of behavior across species.  There is, after 
all, marked differences in behavioral flexibility, learning, and memory between gorillas 
and chameleons.  An adequate theory of content should be able to rule out where and 
when causally efficacious psychological states obtain.    
     The brand of chauvinism I am concerned with draws the line at concept possession, 
which, as the claim goes, is evidenced by language competence.  For our purposes, since 
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chauvinists are provincial about concepts, restricting their application to language users, 
they are provincial about intentional content.  A general articulation of the chauvinist line 
can be summarized with the following argument: 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Argument from the Priority of Concepts 
P1.  Concepts are the constituents of intentional mental states; 
 
P2.  All concept possessors are language users; 
 
P3.  No non-human animals are language users; 
 
C1.  No non-human animals are concept possessors. 
 
C2.  No non-human animals realize intentional mental states. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
     This argument, or arguments much like it, preclude intentional ascription in non-
linguistic creatures.  If one wants to be a realist about intentional content, for example, 
and if concepts are required for intentional content, then intentional ascriptions and the 
psychological states they purport to describe are not warranted where there are no 
concepts.8 
     I do not wish to challenge P1.  The view I develop below is consistent with that claim.  
So, if we leave questions regarding the possibility of animal proto-languages aside, it is 
clear that P2 shoulders the work for the chauvinist argument. Since P2 is the load-bearing 
premise, we should dig in here.  Why must concept possessors be language users?   
 
3. An Inadequate Concept of ‘Concept’ 
                                                 
8 This line has been argued forcefully by Davidson in several contexts.  For one, see Inquiries Into Truth 
and Interpretation.  Oxford: Oxford University Press.  1975.  Unless otherwise noted, find all references to 
Davidson in the anthology Problems of Rationality.  Oxford: Oxford University Press.  2004. 
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     The chauvinist denies, on grounds of language competence, that concepts and higher 
cognitive functioning obtain in non-linguistic creatures.  I will argue that it is because 
chauvinist strategies deploy a faulty notion of concepts that it ultimately fails.  Moreover, 
problems generated by a similar faulty notion of concept spill over into other 
conversations with the effect of perpetuating problems for cognitive ethologists and 
philosophers who concern themselves with the possibility of intentionality in non-human 
animals.   
     Since ‘concept possessors’ constitutes the key category in question, we need a 
working definition of ‘concept,’ and one to which all parties would likely assent.  To this 
end, consider concepts to be the constituents of content bearing, psychological structures.  
This rendering of concepts is intended to be more or less consistent with a broadly 
cognitivist construal.  Concepts are the constituents some kinds of mental representations.  
For present purposes, concepts are a fundamental kind of representation, one which more 
complex representations may structure around.  This is also consistent with the 
psychology literature, where concepts are deployed in the explanation of diverse 
psychological phenomena.   
     Note that this construal is also consistent with the chauvinist approach insofar as 
concepts are held to be fundamental constituents of the propositional attitudes.  I assume 
that concepts bear content, in the most general sense, on both interpretations.9  Here I am 
not so much concerned with theorizing about the structure of concepts per se.  I assume 
that concepts have structure, and that they contribute to the structure of certain kinds of 
                                                 
9 That is, I assume that if psychological structures are content bearing structures, then the constituents of 
psychological structures bear content.  This may be controversial, but it is consistent with chauvinism, and 
certainly Davidson takes this to be the case. 
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complex mental representations.10  If we accept this rough and ready notion of concepts, 
then if we can motivate concept attribution in non-linguistic creatures, we can motivate a 
realist approach to intentional ascription across species.  This is not a novel strategy, 
although, I will argue, it is one that has been stymied by an inadequate notion of 
concepts. 
 
3.1 
     It is popular among chauvinists to argue that if one has a concept, one necessarily has 
a belief.  In fact, the argument goes, one must have the concept BELIEF in order to have 
any belief; this entails the further commitment that one understands that he might be 
wrong about what he believes.  So, if one has a concept, any concept, one also has a 
concept of objective truth.  At all events, having any concept entails having many 
concepts, each bearing actual and potential inferential relations to others in a holistic 
network.  On this approach, concept possession entails the possession of full-blown 
propositional attitudes of the kind alluded to in folk-psychological explanation.11  If 
concepts entail full-blown propositional attitudes, which seem to come together with the 
logical machinery underwriting language use, then language competence is a necessary 
condition for concept possession.  The analogy between natural languages and the logical 
properties of propositional attitudes, after all, seems very strong.  The upshot: 
“Speechless creatures lack the conceptual framework which supports the propositional 
                                                 
10 I should also note that since I assume that concepts bear content, I assume that they have intentional 
properties.  It is relatively uncontroversial that at least one kind of concept (i.e. those involved in language 
processing) exhibit the ‘aboutness’ that is the hallmark of intentionality.  Herein, I mean to intimate that 
intentionality (at least to some degree) comes with being a concept; intentionality (at least to some degree) 
comes with being any kind of concept.  More below.   
11 In effect, “There is no distinction to be made between having concepts and having propositional 
attitudes.”  Davidson: 137. 
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attitudes,”12 and they lack anything resembling the intentional mental states that would 
warrant intentional ascription in explanations of their behavior.   
     It is worth pointing to the extremity of this articulation of chauvinism.  Davidson, for 
his part, never asks, in earnest, whether or not some creatures have simpler, degraded, or 
different concepts.  His question is whether animals have any concepts at all.  This 
construal of the chauvinist notion of concepts reveals an all-or-nothing account of 
intentionality.  For, without (at least) an appeal to concepts, any project positing 
intentional content in non-linguistic creatures seems potentially groundless. 
      
3.2       
     Now that the stage has been set, I will argue for the attribution of intentionality to 
some non-linguistic creatures.  I will argue from two conditional claims as follows: 1) if 
the concept kind splits appropriately (if there are non-linguistic concepts), then some 
concept kinds are attributable to some non-linguistic creatures, and 2) if some concept 
kinds are attributable to some non-linguistic creatures, then intentional ascriptions are 
attributable to some non-linguistic creatures.  To further motivate my argument, I will 
look in some detail at one entrenched psychological phenomena: discrimination.  
Discrimination is frequently deployed ambiguously, to the advantage of chauvinism and 
to the detriment of cognitive ethology.  I aim to show that a discrimination versus 
conceptualization dichotomy is at best confused, at worst false.    
 
4. Splitting Concepts 
                                                 
12 Davidson: 137. 
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     Gualtiero Piccinini and Sam Scott have submitted arguments for the plausibility of 
concept splitting on the grounds of explanatory necessity.13  Since my topic regards 
intentional ascription for the purposes of psychological explanation, we can follow 
Piccinini and Scott in sharpening our working notion of concepts to the “mental 
particulars posited as a specific part of the explanation for certain cognitive 
phenomena.”14  Again, note that this definition is consistent with chauvinism, where there 
is only one cognitive phenomenon to be explained, i.e. propositional thought itself.  It is 
not lost on Piccinini and Scott that any claim to the effect that ‘thought’, itself, represents 
a singular natural kind sounds suspiciously folkish.  However, if thoughts and their 
conceptual constituents were to be classified under a singular kind, the chauvinist 
strategy might gain substantive empirical support and might ultimately be vindicated.  
This is precisely the position I aim to challenge. 
     Concepts are typically invoked in explanations of a more or less uncontroversial set of 
psychological phenomena.  Piccinini and Scott formulate their desiderata on concepts, 
which are typically posited in the explanation of psychological phenomena: 1) 
discrimination, 2) non-linguistic inference, 3) categorization, 4) word and sentence 
understanding, 5) linguistic inference, and 6) lexical combination.15 
    To motivate genuine concept splitting, we need to provide grounds to accept the claim 
that different kinds of mental representation, posited in the explanation of some subset of 
                                                 
13 Piccinini and Scott.  'Splitting Concepts’.  Forthcoming in Philosophy of Science. (2006) 
14 Piccinini and Scott (2006) 
15 Piccinini and Scott (2006) The desiderata refer respectively to the following: 1) differential response to 
objects and properties with some important commonality, 2) inferences based on experience, i.e. the kind of 
learning exhibited when behavior is modified according to experience, for example birds that learn to avoid 
ingesting monarch butterflies after having been made ill by them, 3) the association of particular stimuli 
with particular response behaviors, 4) processing language in accordance with public norms, 5) inferring by 
word association or sentential form, 6) combining words and sentences creatively yet appropriately, in 
accordance with the public norms regulating their constituents. 
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the phenomena, structure around different kinds of concept.  One way to do this is to 
show that the constituents of different kinds of mental representation are sustained and 
causally effected by different scientifically relevant clusters of properties and causal 
mechanisms with independent evolutionary histories.16   
     While Piccinini and Scott submit two arguments for genuine concept splitting, 
providing support on independent grounds, our primary concern here is only with what 
they call the argument from language.  Motivating the argument from language is the 
growing body of evidence in both linguistics and psychology indicating that the 
mechanisms underwriting natural language competence and use differ qualitatively from 
those underwriting other higher cognitive functioning.  The body of evidence is robust 
enough that psychologists and cognitive scientists hold that desiderata (1) to (3) involve 
mental representations that are qualitatively different than those involved in desiderata 
(4) to (6).   
     The occurrence of natural language is apparently specific to human beings.  Moreover, 
the occurrence of language is increasingly considered to be genetically canalized and 
identifiable with particular regions of the cerebral cortex.17  The latter point is 
presumably part of the explanation for why it is possible to independently disrupt 
language processing, without detriment to other ‘higher’ cognitive processes.  On these 
grounds, it is at least plausible to posit that the concepts involved in language processing 
and linguistic representations split from those involved in one or more of the other 
desiderata.  The argument from language runs as follows: 
                                                 
16 Piccinini and Scott (2006) 
17 Pinker, Steven.  The Language Instinct.  New York: W. Morrow and Co.  1994.  Also, Gazzaniga, 
Michael S., R. B. Ivry, G. R. Mangun, and T. Y. Swaab.  “Language and the Brain”, in Cognitive 
Neuroscience: The Biology of the Mind, Second Edition.  New York: W. Norton & Company.  351-99. 
2002. 
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________________________________________________________________________ 
Argument from Language18 
P1.  If concepts are a singular natural kind, then there is one kind of mental 
representation that satisfies (1) through (6); 
 
P2. Desiderata (1) to (3) require the postulation of one kind of mental 
representation; 
 
P3.  Desiderata (4) to (6) require the postulation of a different kind of mental 
representation; 
 
P4.  These two kinds of mental representation possess different clusters of 
scientifically relevant properties; 
 
C1.  There is no single kind of mental representation that satisfies desiderata (1) to 
(6). 
 
C2. Concepts split into different natural kinds. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
     The argument from language is significant since it calls attention to what appears to be 
a qualitative difference between the kinds of concepts involved in explanations of 
desiderata (1) to (3) and (4) to (6).  As such, the argument submits an immediate 
challenge to P2 in the argument from the priority of concepts: the claim that all concept 
possessors are language users.  For, while the concepts invoked in explanations of (4) to 
(6) refer to psychological phenomena involved in language processing, those invoked in 
(1) to (3) may not, or need not.  On these grounds, we have some justification for positing 
at least two different kinds of concepts.   
     Let the kind of concepts appealed to in explanations of desiderata (1) to (3) be called 
perceptual concepts, or P-concepts.  Call the kind of concepts appealed to in explanations 
of desiderata (4) to (6) linguistic concepts, or L-concepts.  The idea here, as Piccinini and 
Scott point out, is not that L-concepts are incapable of interacting and or combining in 
                                                 
18 Piccinini and Scott (2006) 
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any way with P-concepts.  It is just that L-concepts are qualitatively different than P-
concepts; they have independent evolutionary histories, are enabled by different 
biological mechanisms, and they enable the realization of qualitatively different kinds of 
mental representations. 
 
4.2 
     I will introduce one immediate objection here, and will discuss the issue at length in 
the following section.  Chauvinists about intentional ascription are wont to simply deny 
that desiderata (1) through (3) require concepts.  It’s not clear, at least on the face of it, 
that discrimination, for instance, requires concepts.  The objection must be taken 
seriously by anyone who wants to deploy conceptual representations in the explanation of 
the behavior of a non-linguistic creature.   
     Roughly, the objection goes as follows.  Many non-linguistic creatures exhibit 
sophisticated discriminatory capacities.  We see this even as ‘low’ on the phylogentic tree 
as the insect world.  Wasps, for instance, seem perfectly capable of ‘discriminating’ 
crickets from, say, rocks.  But certainly discrimination does not involve or entail 
concepts; otherwise wasps have concepts.  We will have to say something about this, 
including a brief statement about the role of concepts in scientific explanation, without 
getting sidetracked into questions about the role of philosophy and other methodological 
issues. 
     First, whether or not philosophers sympathetic to the chauvinist strategy would allow 
that concepts are integral to desiderata (1) to (3), cognitive scientists and psychologists 
find them essential in adequately accounting for the diverse phenomena, each of which 
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apparently occur in diverse species to different degrees.  But this is not to simply pooh-
pooh the objection.  Invoking different kinds of representations in the explanations of the 
psychological phenomena given in the desiderata on concepts is necessary to make sense 
of them, in particular for the purposes of induction and scientific explanation.  In short, 
the important question is which theory provides the best explanation of the cognitive 
phenomena that typically appeal to concepts.  Given the explanatory force of concepts, 
and given a plausible argument for concept splitting, chauvinism appears to be provincial 
to a fault.  Or, granting that chauvinism may be well argued and tenable, we might 
consider restricting it to a theory of the concepts involved in the explanation of 
desiderata (4) to (6).  That is, at best, chauvinism is a self-limiting strategy just because it 
recognizes only L-concepts. 
     One might conclude that chauvinists are prone to ask loaded questions when it comes 
to concept attribution for the purposes of intentional ascription in non-linguistic creatures.  
Consider this oft-quoted passage from Davidson: 
 
The dog, we say, knows that its master is home. But does it know that Mr. Smith 
(who is the master) is home? We have no real idea how to settle, or make sense 
of, these questions.19   
 
Not many would be willing, in earnest, to ascribe a propositional attitude to the dog of the 
form:  “Rover believes that Mr. Smith is home.”  For one thing, this would entail Rover’s 
possession of the lexical concept ‘home’, and perhaps even his possession of the concepts 
of belief and objective truth (as Davidson would argue).  The question also assumes that 
we would need to award some capacity for lexical combination to Rover, where the dog 
                                                 
19 Davidson, Donald.  ‘Thought and Talk’.  In Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation.  Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  1975. 
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is able to combine concepts like ‘Mr. Smith’ with other lexical concepts like ‘Master’.  
That is the price of ascribing the belief that Mr. Smith is home to Rover without deferring 
to a watered-down instrumentalism.  The point I wish to make is that Davidson’s 
question assumes that to have a concept is to have an L-concept, and to have all the 
cognitive capabilities that seem to go along with having L-concepts.   
     The question is loaded.  Just because L-concepts are apparently unwarranted, it does 
not follow that any and all ascriptions of conceptual mental representations are 
unwarranted.  It may be true that we cannot answer Davidson’s question, but only 
because it’s the wrong question to ask in the first place.   
 
 
II. Two Kinds of Concept; Two Degrees of Intentionality 
 
5. Wasps and Pigeons: Disambiguating the Phenomenon of ‘Discrimination’ 
     I now turn my attention to desideratum (1): discrimination.  I aim to criticize the 
intuition that there is a qualitative difference between conceiving of objects and 
properties and discriminating them.  If this is a false distinction, we have further grounds 
for motivating concept attribution and intentional ascription in some non-linguistic 
creatures.  Of course, it would also be interesting and useful to look at desiderata (2) and 
(3), non-linguistic inference and categorization.  I’ve suggested that the mental 
representations theorized to explain all of (1) to (3) might structure around P-concepts 
instead of L-concepts.  Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of my project to give a 
satisfactory treatment of all three desiderata, showing how they might be related, etc.  
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Instead I’ll focus on the phenomenon of discrimination, in order to draw out what I take 
to be the ambiguous and confused reference to this phenomenon by all parties. 
 
5.1 
     If the discrimination/conceptualization dichotomy is fallacious, one might suspect that 
the problem, at root, might be merely terminological.  Perhaps.  But if so, it’s an 
important terminological problem.  At present, there’s an inconsistent triad where either 
(1) some kind of concept is involved in discrimination, or (2) none are involved, or (3) 
there are two different phenomena (only one of which is a psychological phenomenon) 
classed under the same word.  Clearly (1) and (2) are not compatible.  It seems we’re left 
with (3), and with the terminological issue of which phenomenon represents 
discrimination proper.  After all, we do not want to say that Mike ‘discriminates’ stop 
signs and that army ants ‘discriminate’ army ant larvae without making some 
qualifications and distinctions.  We need to be clear about how we are using the term, 
about what sort of phenomenon we are referring to when we use the term.  In the end, we 
do best to reserve ‘discrimination’ for reference to the psychological phenomenon 
described in desideratum (1).  As such, explaining a true discriminatory capacity in an 
organism requires an appeal to mental representations and, at least, P-concepts.  If the 
concept kind splits, this opens important doors for the purposes of intentional 
explanations of behavior.   
     Why stipulate that ‘discrimination’ is a psychological phenomenon?  Well, we might 
first ask the following question: what would discrimination without concepts amount to?  
I suspect that what passes for ‘discrimination’ in many non-linguistic creatures is not 
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properly referred to as discrimination at all, and, indeed, many who deploy the term do 
not intend to be referring to our desideratum (1).  Or, if they do so intend, they would 
submit that (1) is a strictly behavioral phenomenon that does not require an appeal to 
concepts or mental representations.  If this is the case, we simply need to police our usage 
of ‘discrimination’.  I suppose we could opt to subscribe to (2) from the triad above.  We 
should say, for instance, that wasps discriminate crickets.  But we should not say that 
Tiger Woods ‘discriminates’ golf balls.  In the former case, the explanatory story of the 
wasp’s behavior will presumably be told in the language of chemistry and molecular 
physics.  It is likely that no concepts obtain in the wasp, not even P-concepts, and so 
intentional ascription/explanation is unwarranted.  In the latter case, we have all kinds of 
L-concepts to appeal to in explaining Woods’ behavior.  It is likely that Woods has full-
blown propositional attitudes that take golf balls as a substantial part of their content.  In 
other words, Woods represents golf balls, but the wasp likely does not represent crickets.  
I think there is certainly an important distinction to be drawn here, but I also think that 
appealing to a non-intentional, non-conceptual capacity to ‘discriminate’ is a bad way to 
characterize the distinction.  More below. 
     I emphasize here what appears to be a tacit (problematic) commitment to envisaging 
concepts as L-concepts, full stop.  This commitment reinforces the belief that concepts 
constitute a singular kind and perpetuates what I take to be the false distinction between 
discriminating objects in the environment and realizing conceptual mental representations 
of objects in the environment.  Here is Davidson wielding the confused notion of 
‘discrimination’ I refer to: 
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“It is not easy to say what must be added to the power of discrimination to turn it 
into command of a concept.”20 
 
What is important to emphasize is that the commitment to concepts as something very 
like L-concepts is not limited to chauvinist strategies.  For instance, here is an articulation 
of the dichotomy from Colin Allen and Marc Hauser: 
 
The distinction to be made is between recognizing an X, and recognizing 
something as an X or recognizing it to be an X.  The first of these is thought of as 
an extensional characterization of a discriminatory ability.  The organism said to 
have the ability has some way of sorting things into the classes specified (X and 
non-X)….The second says something about the organism’s system of internal 
representation.  To have a concept of X where the specification of X is not 
exhausted by a perceptual characterization, it is not enough just to have the ability 
to discriminate X’s from non-X’s.  One must have a representation of X that 
abstracts away from the perceptual features that enable one to identify X’s.21 
 
Elsewhere, according to Stephan Achim, the essence of the dichotomy is this:  
 
…the decisive question is whether other plausible categories of the Intentional 
exist which can be located between the strong notion of having beliefs and 
concepts in Davidson’s sense, on the one hand, and the weak notion of being 
merely able to make some discriminations, on the other.22 
 
These authors defer to the faulty ideal of a singular concept kind, with the effect of 
deploying ‘discrimination’ ambiguously.  In effect, we only confuse the issue of the 
explanatory role of discrimination, as a behavioral/psychological phenomenon, if we 
insist that there is a ‘weak notion’ of ‘discrimination’, one that does not involve concepts.  
                                                 
20 Davidson: 9. 
21 Allen, C. and Marc D. Hauser.  ‘Concept Attribution in Nonhuman Animals: Theoretical and 
Methodological Problems in Ascribing Complex Mental Processes’.  Philosophy of Science, Vol. 58, No. 2: 
221-240.  1991. 
22 Achim, Stephan.  ‘Are Animals Capable of Concepts?’  Erkenntnis, Vol. 51: 79-92.  1999. 
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To so insist is to be guilty of speaking metaphorically about the behavior of some 
organisms, i.e. sunflowers, earthworms, etc. 
     Note how closely the language of Achim, Allen, and Hauser mirrors the chauvinist 
account of what it is to have a concept.  Concepts afford something to a non-intentional 
capacity for ‘discrimination’, namely, the ability to sort or class an object or property as 
an instantiation of some broader category of object or property.  It is characteristic of 
concepts, across disciplines concerned with them, that they are mental representations or 
that they constitute mental representations that are somehow independently describable 
from the physical, sensory/informational input that might cause them or to which they 
might refer.  For our purposes, the notable point is that representations of this kind should 
enable a creature’s ability to modify behavior in an important way.  In addition to 
responding differentially to stimuli in the local environment (a capacity attributable even 
to thermostats, sunflowers, and wasps), the capacity affords the ability to respond to 
internal representations. 
     Jerry Fodor called the referents of such internal representations non-nomic properties 
of an object or state of affairs, since they apparently do not bear the kind of lawful 
relations to the external environment typical of reflexive, stimulus-response relations.23  
Fodorian non-nomic properties are, in effect, properties conceived-of or attributed to 
objects by a creature in possession of something very like L-concepts.  This is one way of 
avoiding a slippery slope regarding intentional ascription: paramecia, sunflowers, and 
thermostats do not warrant the ascription of intentionality because they are incapable of 
responding differentially to non-nomic properties; they simply do not realize mental 
                                                 
23Fodor, Jerry.  ‘Why Paramecia Don’t Have Mental Representations’.  Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 
Vol. 10, 3-23.  1986.  For cases of non-nomic properties, Fodor submits the following examples: being a 
left shoe, being furrier than a breadbox, being a crumpled-shirt, etc. 
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representations that abstract away from stimuli.  Thus Fodor provides a neat answer to 
the problem of intentional ascription.  Any creature that exhibits what he calls property P, 
the ability to respond differentially to non-nomic properties (i.e. internal 
mental/conceptual representations), warrants intentional ascription. 
     Unfortunately, as Fodor more or less admits, this solution is of limited use.  While it 
apparently dictates that human beings warrant intentional ascription, and that paramecia 
and sunflowers do not, it fails to indicate whether cats, vervet monkeys, bonobos, warrant 
intentional ascription.  We have, again, a plausible realism about intentionality, but we 
are left wondering about the behavior of huge percentage of earthly species.  On a strong 
reading Fodor comes very close to advocating a naturalistic variety of chauvinism:   
 
[A] verbal organism has resources for communicating, in considerable detail, not 
only what it sees, but also what it sees as.  Roughly, the predicates of a natural 
language are sliced thin enough to correspond one-to-one with the properties to 
which we can respond selectively…24 (my emphasis) 
 
     In short, it seems to be extremely difficult to characterize non-nomic properties 
without recourse to lexical concepts.  Somehow naming seems fundamental, and we 
come very close again to equivocating between L-concepts and concepts tout court. 
 
5.2 
     One particularly salient repercussion of making L-concepts necessary for 
representation and intentionality is a pervasive acceptance of the view that there is an 
important qualitative distinction between classificatory capabilities and discriminatory 
                                                 
24 Fodor (1986) 
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capabilities.  Whereas language users seem to deploy mental representations in order to 
classify objects, it is not clear that any non-linguistic creatures do.  It’s not clear, in other 
words, that Rover or the wasp ever entertain any mental representations that enable 
classification or categorization such as those we take to be enabled by the possession of 
L-concepts.  In so many words: the ability to ‘discriminate’ objects in the local 
environment does not entail the obtaining or the application of a concept.  Perhaps we 
should accept (2) in our triad on discrimination?   
     After all, if we define discrimination in terms a creature’s differential response to 
external sensory input in the local environment, and if we posit that the mental 
representations involved in desiderata (1) to (3) structure around concepts, doesn’t that 
entail that sunflowers, paramecia, and thermometers have concepts?  Have we trivialized 
intentionality by awarding thermometers mental representations, thus making them 
legitimate candidates for intentional ascription?  Such questions have underwritten 
chauvinism, instrumentalism, and eliminativism, and the answers, to a certain extent, 
depend on our usage of ‘discrimination’.   
     If we want to make concepts integral to discrimination while motivating concept 
attribution in some non-linguistic creatures, it will help to combine genuine concept 
splitting with some behavioral evidence.  What we need is for the appeal to concepts and 
mental representations in non-linguistic creatures to provide either a better explanation of 
specific behaviors or at least one that is presumably consistent with physical explanation.  
I maintain, again, that if we want to be realists about psychological states in general, and 
we accept concept splitting, we must accept on the grounds of explanatory necessity that 
some non-linguistic creatures have, at least, P-concepts.  Any attempt, it seems, to 
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dismiss some instances of complex animal behavior as mere ‘discrimination’ without 
mental representation comes across as hand waving in the face of potentially better 
explanation.  In the following sub-section, we’ll look in a little more detail at a particular 
case in which the discrimination versus conceptualization dichotomy is salient.  
 
5.3 
     In 1976 Herrnstein, Loveland, and Cable published a study entitled “Natural Concepts 
in Pigeons”.25  The experiments purported to provide empirical support for the hypothesis 
that pigeons have concepts for certain objects in their local environments.  In the study, 
pigeons were shown pictures of trees, parts of trees, and pictures that had nothing to do 
with trees.  The pigeons demonstrated that they were capable of differentially pecking at 
a feeder key that stood in for a ‘tree’ category, in accord with pictures with which they 
were presented.   
     Allen and Hauser prudently point out that the study does not go very far toward 
confirming the hypothesis that pigeons have the concept ‘tree’, ‘tree-branch’, or any 
other. 
 
To say that the pigeons sort pictures into categories of tree…is…a considerably 
less specific claim about the internal representations involved than the claim that 
pigeons have concepts of those things…We are supposing that an explanation of 
this ability will attribute some kind of internal representation to guide the 
classification.  But is this enough to allow us to say that the pigeons possess the 
corresponding concepts?26 
 
                                                 
25 Herrnstein, R.J., D. H. Loveland and C. Cable.  ‘Natural Concepts in Pigeons’, Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, Animal Behavior Processes Vol. 2, 285-302.  1976. 
26 Allen and Hauser (1991) 
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It seems to me that both the study and the prudent remarks of Allen and Hauser beg the 
question of what it is for a creature to discriminate properties in its environment.  Are the 
observations enough to determine that some appeal to concepts (of some kind) is 
warranted in an explanation of the pigeons’ behavior?  That might depend on whether we 
are guilty of equivocating between P-concepts and L-concepts.  If we are, then we are 
likely subscribing to the theory that concepts constitute a singular natural kind.   
     Notice that Herrnstein et al, along with Allen and Hauser, assume that there are 
probably internal representations involved in the pigeons’ discriminatory behavior.  Both 
parties deploy a broad sense of representation, assuming a distinction between conceptual 
and non-conceptual representations.  I am primarily interested in the former, and admit 
that I cannot hope to adequately integrating the latter into the conversation here without 
straying too far off topic.   
     The question of non-conceptual content notwithstanding, the point I want to 
emphasize here is that the question of whether pigeons possess concepts that correspond 
to the lexicalized categories in question (tree, tree-branch, etc.) is inappropriately framed.  
If we accept that concepts split in the way suggested, the question changes from ‘do 
pigeons have concepts?’ to ‘do pigeons have P-concepts?’  The latter is a significantly 
more focused question that might help an empirical investigation to avoid some of the 
problems generated by an ambiguous deployment of some of the relevant terms: concept, 
representation, discrimination, etc.  Since pigeons apparently do not have L-concepts, it 
should be determined if the evidence generated by the experiments is sufficient to 
determine if they have P-concepts.  Is the behavior in question best explained by an 
appeal to mental representations that structure around the kind of concepts required for 
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discrimination, non-linguistic inference, and categorization?  If not, then not even 
discrimination is a legitimate part of an explanation of pigeon sorting behavior.  For, if 
discrimination is a genuine psychological phenomenon, it implies intentionality.  This 
point does not rest on any assumptions about how we should define behavior.  It’s just 
that the best explanations of some behavior will be mechanistic while others will be at 
least partially intentional.   
     However, if we choose to subscribe to an account of discrimination which disregards 
its association with concepts we have another problem: it is just question-begging (at 
least in some cases; I have examples below) to explain a behavior by appealing to some 
non-conceptual capacity (even one that involves internal representations) to pick out 
certain features of the environment.  One might motivate this argument by stipulating that 
only L-concepts are properly called concepts.  But, again, we have reason, independent of 
behavioral evidence, to deny this.  And even here, we might posit that internal 
representations, even non-conceptual ones, should they exist, have intentional properties 
(i.e. they are ‘about’ things).  I have a hard time making sense of the idea of an internal 
representation that it is not about anything.  In any case, the problem of intentional 
ascription would still stand.    
     For our purposes, if the pigeons do not realize concepts of any kind, then, barring 
some plausible theory of non-conceptual, intentional content, no mental content can be 
ascribed when a pigeon executes some ‘sorting’ procedure.  In this case, we should 
assume that an adequate explanation of the pigeon-sorting behavior will eventually be 
given in physico-chemical terms only, without reference to psychological phenomena.  
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Here psychological explanations deploying an intentional vocabulary would be merely 
metaphorical.   
     We might be in agreement with chauvinists at least to the extent that without an appeal 
to concepts of any kind, the ascription of internal representations may not be warranted in 
pigeons.  If the distinction between non-conceptual representation and conceptual 
representation is, as Allen and Hauser indicate, the difference between recognizing an X 
and recognizing something as an X, we may have another false dichotomy on our hands.  
However, if concepts split along the lines suggested by Piccinini and Scott’s argument 
from language, then we can attribute conceptual (intentional) content according to what 
kinds of representation a creature is capable of, and according what concepts are required 
to explain those varieties of representation.  On this construal, we need not commit on the 
question of non-conceptual representations.  The discrimination versus conceptualization 
dichotomy is fallacious because internal representations of the relevant kind require 
concepts (of different kinds, magnitude, and complexity).  
 
5.4 
     In another work, Allen has proposed a set of criteria for the attribution of concepts to 
non-linguistic creatures.  His criteria are particularly salient because they are cast in terms 
of ‘discriminatory’ behavior.  If we continue to bear in mind the ambiguity inherent in 
uses of discrimination in explanation, Allen’s criteria for concept attribution are helpful 
here.  They read as follows.  A creature warrants the attribution of concepts if 1) it 
systematically discriminates between xs and non-xs, 2) it can recognize its own 
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discriminatory errors, and 3) it learns to better discriminate between xs and non-xs as a 
result of its ability to recognize its own discriminatory errors.27   
     While the second and third criteria imply discrimination in the strong, unambiguous 
sense of the word I endeavored to stipulate above, I take the first criterion to be 
problematic, mistakenly deploying ‘discrimination’ to refer to a non-representational 
behavioral tendency (regularity of response to particular classes of stimuli) that does not 
imply discrimination in the strong sense.  Again, this is a terminological issue, but one 
that causes sufficient confusion that it is worth mentioning.  For an animal to exhibit a 
habitual or regular behavior in relation to some class of objects or properties in its 
environment is not sufficient for the proper attribution of discrimination.  Discrimination 
is a psychological phenomenon that requires the possession of at least one kind of 
concept.  We would do well to re-phrase Allen’s first criterion to the exclusion of 
reference to discrimination: 1) a creature must exhibit regularity of response to particular 
classes of stimuli.  Couple this with the other two criteria and I think we are getting 
somewhere. 
     To say that a wasp, for instance, ‘discriminates’ crickets because it systematically 
picks them out and drags them into its nesting ground is far too weak a sense of 
discrimination to use in an explanation of its behavior.  Here ‘discrimination’ is simply a 
placeholder for some chemico-physical story situating the wasp in response to some 
stimuli in its local environment.  The story will be mechanistic to the exclusion of 
psychological phenomena, for wasps show a lack of plasticity to the extent that they 
consistently fail to meet the second and third criteria.  That is, with regard to their cricket-
                                                 
27 Allen, Colin. “Animal Concepts Revisited: The Use of Self-Monitoring as an Empirical Approach”.  
Erkenntnis.  Vol. 51, 33-40.  1999. 
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hording-behavior, wasps utterly fail to adapt to changes in their local environment.28  
There is a lack of evidence to suggest that wasps exert any measure of agency over this 
behavior; the kind of agency that would make an appeal to internal mental 
representations warranted.  In Achim’s terms, the wasps apparently have “no influence on 
the mechanisms that govern their behavior.”29  It precisely that influence on behavior, or 
at least the appearance of that influence, that motivates psychological explanation in 
general.  This is where controlled, experimental data becomes particularly useful.  For, 
while in the wild wasps behave with what appears to be impressive capacities for 
memory and impressively efficient rituals for reproduction; they fail to behave in 
experimental settings in any way that would imply the capacity for generalization over 
categories, non-linguistic inference, or even the ability to discriminate in the strong sense 
for which I’ve advocated. 
     Now, if a creature sharpens its capacity to pick out important objects and stimuli, 
especially if the sharpening is apparently based on errors and occurs even in the face of 
changes in the environment, it seems increasingly likely that the kind of mental 
representations that structure around the concepts needed to explain Piccinini and Scott’s 
desiderata (1) to (3), so at least P-concepts, obtain in the creature.  Such a creature would 
warrant intentional ascription.   
 
6. Degrees of Intentionality 
      So far I have argued that concept attribution is sometimes warranted in the absence of 
linguistic competence (L-concepts), so real intentional ascription is sometimes warranted 
                                                 
28 Achim (1999) 
29 Achim (1999)   
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in the absence of L-concepts, which signal language competence.  I will finally say 
something about motivating degrees of intentionality, how it might be related to concept 
splitting, and why it is an attractive alternative to chauvinism.  For, to say that 
intentionality, tout court, is applicable to creatures in possession of concepts is not to say 
that intentionality admits of degrees. 
     Vervet monkeys in East Africa30 have proved an interesting case for our purposes, 
since they appear to meet Allen’s criteria for concept attribution.  If concept attribution is 
warranted, I propose that vervets do realize intentional states, but that vervet 
intentionality is not as robust or rich as the intentionality that is enabled by the possession 
of L-concepts.  At all events, vervets apparently warrant intentional ascription despite 
their apparent linguistic incompetence.    
      
6.1 
     In their study of vervets, Seyfarth, Cheney, and Marler identified at least four distinct 
alarm calls deployed by the monkeys in response to specific local predators or potential 
threats.  Vervets sound different alarms for leopards, eagles, snakes, and unfamiliar 
human beings that encroach on their territory.  The different alarm calls evince different 
appropriate strategies of evasion in individual monkeys.  For instance, when the snake 
alarm is sounded, the monkeys stand upright, visually scan the area for a snake, and, if 
one is located, attack it as a group.  By contrast, vervets respond to the leopard alarm by 
climbing nearby trees.  Leopards stalk vervets on the ground, typically hiding in the 
undergrowth and pouncing.  Vervet communication and cooperation are impressive, but 
                                                 
30 Seyfarth, R. M., D. L. Cheney and P. Marler.  ‘Vervet Monkey Alarm Calls: Semantic Communication in 
a Free-ranging Primate’.  Animal Behaviour Vol. 28: 1070-1094.  1980. 
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are they enough to warrant concept attribution?  Intentional ascription?  Further 
considerations support affirmative answers to these questions.   
     Vervets learn, by experience, to sharpen the accuracy of their alarm calls.  
Inexperienced vervets are likely to sound the eagle alarm when presented with non-
predatory species of birds.  This indicates that they are not pre-disposed to react to eagle-
stimuli.  It might be the case that they are predisposed to act to eagle-like-stimuli.  If this 
is the case, it could support the conclusion that vervets have some kind of eagle concept, 
perhaps something like an un-lexicalized prototype or exemplar.  I won’t argue that line 
here, but I will point out that this behavior also provides some evidence that some vervets 
meet Allen’s second and third criteria: vervets are capable of sharpening their capacity to 
pick out important objects in their environment, apparently on the basis of experience and 
reinforcement.  Elder vervets alternately chastise and reinforce the false and accurate 
usage of alarm calls respectively.31  This, of course, is another suggest behavior, but I 
won’t discuss it any further here. 
     While the behavior described is impressive and suggestive, the question of whether 
vervets are responding differentially to mental representations remains.  Are conceptual 
mental representations of birds, predatory and non-predatory, involved in vervet 
learning?   It is uncontroversial that many animal species ‘learn’, in some sense of the 
word, but we need to establish the plausibility that the sharpening in vervet monkey 
behavior indicates that they modify behavior (at least in some cases) in response to 
conceptual mental representations.  Given the evidence so far presented, it’s not obvious 
that the best explanation of their behavior involves the attribution of concepts or 
                                                 
31 Allen, C. and M. Bekoff.  Species of Mind.  The Philosophy and Biology of Cognitive Ethology.  MIT 
Press: Cambridge, MA.  1997. 
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intentionality at all.  We might, for example, aim to explain vervet escape behavior by 
giving some complex story of a conditioning process that does not involve conceptual 
representations of any kind.  Perhaps there is a mechanistic story that does not appeal to 
psychological phenomena.   
     Perhaps, but consider that there are observed cases where mature vervets apparently 
give false alarm calls at strategic times.32  This practice has been exhibited, for example, 
during territory disputes with other monkey troops.  In one documented case, a distressed 
vervet climbed a tree and sounded the leopard-alarm during a melee over territory 
boundaries.  The fighting promptly dissolved as monkeys dispersed in response to the 
call.  This might not be as interesting if it were not known how adept vervets are at 
identifying predators and warning each other; nor would it be so if it were not observed 
that the monkey in question was a member of the troop that was losing ground.   
     In fact, mature vervets are likely to refrain from acting on the alarm calls of individual 
monkeys who have repeatedly sounded false alarms.  Achim suggests that, in light of this 
latter behavior, it is likely that mature vervets are capable of comparing “conspecific’s 
utterances with reality to prove aptness.  Thus, vervet monkeys seem to be capable to 
distinguish between true and false alarm calls.”33  In effect, discriminating (in the 
appropriate sense) between probably true and probably false alarm calls provides strong 
evidence that vervet monkeys are capable of making judgments of a sort.  This, in turn, 
would indicate that they are capable of modifying their behavior according to conceptual 
mental representations as opposed to blindly responding to stimuli to which they are pre-
disposed either from birth or from conditioning.  In vervets at least, there is evidence of a 
                                                 
32 Seyfarth, Cheney, and Marler (1980) 
33 Achim (1999) 
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rudimentary inferential process.  There is the further consideration, as well, that the level 
of sophistication of the behavior in question makes it more and more difficult to explain 
in non-intentional terms.  In explaining vervet false alarm calls, to say nothing of the 
‘monkey-who-cried-wolf’ effect, non-intentional explanations may not have the 
theoretical resources to satisfy us.  I don’t mean to beg the question of whether a vervet 
might realize an intentional state.  I only mean to suggest that if we aim to give the best 
explanation, we may need to appeal to conceptual representations and intentional mental 
states.  Ample empirical data, from both natural and laboratory settings are, of course, a 
necessity for determining the case.   
 
6.2      
     A primary goal of mine here is to suggest that concept splitting might diffuse some of 
the typical concerns that have gone hand in hand with attributing conceptual 
representations to non-linguistic creatures.  Of course, difficult questions abound.  Do 
vervets regularly give alarm calls because they believe, in something like the folk-sense 
of believe, that particular kinds of predators are nearby?  Do vervets react or ignore alarm 
calls on the basis of whether or not they believe them to be true or false?  Can we hope to 
answer these and related questions meaningfully without falling down a slippery slope 
that would have us ascribing intentional states to sunflowers and compasses, and without 
resorting to either an instrumentalist or provincial attitude about concepts and 
intentionality?  These questions are clearly underwritten by concerns generated by the 
language of folk-psychology.  What might it be for a vervet monkey to come to a 
concept?  A belief?  Unlike chauvinists, I am more optimistic that we can make sense of 
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such questions.  But I think we can only be so optimistic if we couple concept splitting 
with degrees of intentionality. 
     We should acknowledge, first off, that if we want to answer yes to the question of 
whether vervets realize conceptual mental content to some degree, we currently lack the 
vocabulary to give definite descriptions of that content.  This, of course, is the major 
concern of chauvinists, and it also underwrites anti-realism about intentionality as well.  
But it needn’t be too great a concern.  For, if we accept concept splitting, and we have 
good evidence34, there is no reason to assume that the intentionality of mental states in 
non-linguistic creatures has propositional structure.  This is just to say that, since they 
probably do not have L-concepts, folkish propositional attitude ascriptions will not 
suffice to capture the content of a vervet monkey’s mental state.  This, too, is not a major 
cause for concern.  There are independent reasons to deny that propositional attitude 
                                                 
34 Piccinini and Scott (2006).  The authors offer a second compelling argument for concept splitting.  In 
addition to the Argument from Language, they submit the Argument from Typicality Effects.  It certainly is 
attractive to simply restrict the term ‘concept’ to the psychological structures that are apparently involved 
in language processing.  This is one way to describe the chauvinist program.  But typicality effects like 
those documented by Rosch and Mervis (1973 and 1975) have indicated that in addition to using concepts 
to categorize the world, people frequently make judgments regarding how typical an observed instance is of 
a category.  Judging typicality is common for many “naturally occurring, lexicalized, referring object 
concepts (FRUIT, WEAPON, FISH, FURNITURE, etc.)…”  However, it is significant that typicality 
effects apparently do not generalize to all other categories.  For example, there are categories of ad hoc 
concepts “such as (THINGS TO DO FOR WEEKEND ENTERTAINMENT)….and a class of well-defined 
logical and mathematical concepts (e.g. ODD NUMBER)…” that seem not to structure around similarity 
within a category.  So, we might accept concept splitting on the independent grounds that there might be (at 
least) one kind of similarity-based concepts and (at least) one kind of non-similarity based concepts.  
Interestingly, Piccinini and Scott note that “It is suggestive…that the kinds of concept for which it is 
difficult to demonstrate or intuitively odd to suppose a similarity-based structure are just the kinds of 
concept that we might expect non-linguistic creatures to lack: abstract concepts, which require the ability to 
reason about the non-concrete; ad hoc concepts, which are highly compositional in nature; and…logical 
and mathematical concepts, which are almost certainly unavailable to non-linguistic creatures.”  It is also 
suggestive that some apparently non-similarity based concepts, especially mathematical and logical 
concepts, appear to structure as definitions.  These kinds of concepts lend themselves to the chauvinist 
account of concepts broadly construed, and, as such, might be characterized as L-concepts. 
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ascriptions, typically de dicto ascriptions of content, capture everything there is to capture 
about intentional content, even in language users.35   
     What we can say is that, if we are content to use Allen’s criteria, it is very likely that 
vervet monkeys have P-concepts.  For they are apparently capable of modifying their 
behavior in response to mental representations abstracted from stimuli in their local 
environments.  They appear to engage in rudimentary (non-linguistic) inferential 
processes and appear to be capable of categorizing some objects and states of affairs.   
Moreover, they discriminate, in a very strong sense, between a variety of different 
predator-types, and between true and false alarm calls given by their conspecifics.   
 
Conclusion 
     So far, I have submitted two arguments promoting the ascription of intentionality to 
some non-linguistic creatures.  First, I advocated genuine concept splitting with an eye to 
motivate concept attribution in some non-linguistic species. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Argument from Concept Splitting 
 
P1. Desiderata (1) to (3) require (at least) one kind of mental representation 
(those structuring around P-concepts); 
 
P2.  Desiderata (4) to (6) require (at least) one different kind of mental 
representation (those structuring around L-concepts); 
 
C1.  There is no single kind of concept that satisfies desiderata (1) to (6). 
 
C2.  Explanations of behavior that appeal (appropriately) to desiderata (1) to (3)       
        imply an appeal to (at least) one kind of concept. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                 
35 See: Loar, Brian.  ‘Social and Psychological Content’, in Thought and Content, Robert Grimm and 
Daniel Merrill (eds.), University of Arizona Press, 99-110.  1988.  And: Boghossian, Paul.  ‘The 
Transparency of Mental Content’.  Nous-Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives.  Vol. 8.  1994. 
Ferreira, Michael, 2006, UMSL, p. 42
     Genuine concept splitting provides general support for concept attribution where 
language is not present.  We should believe that L-concepts are proprietary, differing in 
kind from (at least) P-concepts for the following reasons.  It has been well documented 
that it is possible to disrupt language processing and associated tasks without disrupting 
other cognitive functioning.  This fact is particularly salient.  For, a human subject may 
lose the ability to effectively interpret and express one self in a natural language (due, for 
example, to brain trauma or lesions), while apparently retaining some or all of the 
cognitive abilities associated with desiderata (1) to (3).  This suggests that the kinds of 
mental representations involved in desiderata (1) to (3) structure around a different kind 
of concepts.  Also, language use and processing apparently requires species specific 
genetic and phenotypic traits.  While it seems obvious that most or perhaps all non-
human animals are incapable of word and sentence understanding, linguistic inference, 
and lexical combination, it is far from obvious that they are incapable of discrimination 
(in the relevant sense), non-linguistic inference, and categorization. 
     Secondly, I submitted the following argument, which attends to a terminological issue 
with regard to the phenomenon of ‘discrimination’.   
________________________________________________________________________ 
Argument from Discrimination36 
 
P1.  (By definition) Discrimination (properly attributed) in non-linguistic   
        creatures requires an appeal to mental representations that structure around   
        (at least) P-concepts; 
 
P2.  (By definition) P-concepts have intentional properties; 
 
                                                 
36 I have purposefully limited my inquiry to desideratum (1), and acknowledge that it is a consequence of 
the argument that if a creature is truly capable of discrimination, it is likewise capable of non-linguistic 
inference and categorization.  If an organism has P-concepts, it is likely that these three psychological 
phenomena can be attributed to different degrees depending on the organism. 
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C1.  Non-linguistic creatures that have P-concepts warrant intentional ascription. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
     Why should we accept P1?  Why grant that any non-linguistic creatures discriminate 
in the sense stipulated?  I’ve suggested that we stipulate that discrimination implies 
concepts on the grounds that 1) discrimination is already widely held to be a 
psychological phenomenon and 2) appeals to discrimination in the literature across 
disciplines are ambiguous.  We want to avoid appeals to discrimination in multiple, 
incompatible contexts.  For another example, we don’t want to say that Jones 
‘discriminates’ the outline of a palm tree in the distance as he slowly dehydrates in the 
desert and that the coral ‘discriminates’ the potentially threatening member of the same 
species growing millimeters away when it commences with its offensive.  Yet, these 
apparently incompatible cases of use are common in the literature across disciplines.  In 
short, we need to either take discrimination for a psychological phenomenon or for a non-
mental ability.  The argument from discrimination advocates for an unambiguous sense 
of discrimination in order to avoid equivocating discrimination as a psychological 
phenomenon and instances of non-intentional response behavior.   
     I assume P2.  That is, anything properly called a concept or a conceptual 
representation must be ‘about’ something in the representational, intentional sense.  
Concepts, of all kinds, are psychological/representational structures and have 
psychological/representational content.     
     Of course, one might question whether I haven’t simply recast the problem I began 
with, without offering even a strategy for approaching the problem as I promised.  After 
all, hasn’t the question simply changed from ‘which creatures warrant intentional 
ascription?’ to ‘which creatures warrant the ascription of P-concepts?’  Perhaps, but I 
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maintain that it is an open empirical question which creatures warrant the ascription of P-
concepts.  I promised only a theoretical approach to the problem of intentional ascription.  
On this approach, granting concept splitting, we leave the door open for the ascription of 
concepts in non-linguistic creatures, and so for intentional ascription in non-linguistic 
creatures.  I have tried to plausibly distinguish between one kind of concept involved in 
linguistic representations on the one hand and another kind involved in non-linguistic (yet 
intentional) representations on the other.  In doing so, we have some interesting 
possibilities regarding the ascription of intentionality where language is not present.  I 
also assume that discovering the character of concepts of different kinds is as much a 
matter for empirical inquiry as it is for a priori analyses.  In fact, I accept that there may 
turn out to be more than two kinds of concept, in which case there may be more than two 
degrees of intentionality. 
     This is an inherently interdisciplinary inquiry, and ongoing, robustly interdisciplinary 
investigation may reveal a set of genotypic and phenotypic traits that constitute a likely 
minimal set of criteria for the ascription of any kind of concepts.  We could draw a line of 
sorts here (although it need not be a definite line).  Creatures meeting the minimum 
genotypic and phenotypic criteria would warrant intentional ascription.  We would then 
want develop a way of describing the intentionality of, for instance, P-concepts and the 
representations which structure around them. 
     Underwriting the arguments I’ve submitted is the assumption that concepts are the 
constituents of some kinds of mental representation, and that all kinds of conceptual 
mental representation derive their intentional properties from their constituent parts.  
Where there are concepts, no matter the kind of concept, there is a relation exhibiting 
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intentional ‘aboutness’, and where such a relation obtains, intentional ascription is 
warranted.   
     Finally, if the concept kind splits in a way resembling the way Piccinini and Scott 
have proposed, then we might further diffuse traditional worries about ascribing concepts 
to non-linguistic creatures by proposing that intentionality admits of (at least two) 
degrees.  Roughly, the degree of intentionality would be a function of the concept kind 
and kind of mental representation in question.  L-concepts, as the players in such 
psychological phenomena as word and sentence comprehension, linguistic inference, and 
lexical combination, afford an exceptionally robust and rich degree of intentionality.  
This is the intentionality of folk-psychology.  We can certainly accept that linguistic 
competence affords a capacity to harbor and articulate beliefs and desires that either fail 
to obtain or go inexpressible in non-linguistic creatures.  L-concepts bear innumerable 
logical relations to each other, can play a role in linguistic inference, and are subject to an 
undetermined degree of lexical combination.  But we need not, given these 
considerations, subscribe to chauvinism about intentionality.  Chauvinism, recall, is a 
provincial strategy insofar as it limits its purview to the intentionality afforded by L-
concepts.  As such, it presents us with a theory of L-concepts.  It may be that chauvinism 
has much to contribute to our understanding of L-concepts, but it is not obvious that it 
presents a viable theory of intentionality in general. 
     By contrast, P-concepts afford a substantially truncated degree of intentionality.  On 
this view, vervet monkeys, among many other non-linguistic species with sophisticated 
nervous systems, do realize intentional mental states.  That is, their experience of the 
world is such that they harbor representations, structuring around P-concepts, that are 
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about things in their environment.  The character and structure of those concepts and the 
representations they constitute is subject to further empirical and philosophical research. 
     In closing, I submit the argument for degrees of intentionality:  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Argument for Degrees of Intentionality 
 
P1.  Discrimination, inferences based on experience, and the arbitrary association  
        of stimuli with appropriate response behavior require mental representations   
        that structure around P-concepts; 
 
P2.  Word and sentence comprehension, linguistic inference, and lexical  
        combination require mental representations that structure around L-concepts  
        (possibly in addition to P-concepts); 
 
P3.  All concepts have intentional properties;   
 
P4.  The kind of mental representations structuring around L-concepts are more  
        highly compositional and bear a higher (potentially unlimited) number of  
        inferential relations than those structuring around P-concepts; 
 
C.  Intentionality admits of (at least) two degrees of psychological complexity. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
     Assuming that enough evidence has been provided to support P1 and P2 above, and 
assuming that P3 is uncontroversial, why should we go all-in, accepting P4 and 
concluding degrees of intentionality?  The idea that L-concepts are more complex, at 
least in the two respects listed, should be a consequence of concept splitting as described.  
It seems clear, at least intuitively, that the intentionality of some psychological states 
realized by language users is substantially richer than anything non-human species are 
capable of.  This much seems obvious from the sheer capacity for cognitive manipulation 
and behavioral flexibility that seems to go with language mastery.37   
                                                 
37 Another attractive feature of concept splitting is that it enables us to be holists about L-concepts while 
reserving judgment on the properties of P-concepts.  We might very well go ahead and endorse some of the 
considerations put forth by chauvinists about L-concepts.  But we need not with respect to P-concepts. 
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     Finally, one way to articulate the question behind the problem of intentional ascription 
is this: is intentionality an all-or-nothing phenomenon?  Many approaches to the problem 
have answered yes to this question.  If so, it would seem difficult to argue for 
intentionality in other species without trivializing our folk-psychological notions.  If this 
is unacceptable, then our options are limited.  We could adopt an anti-realism about 
intentionality or a variety of chauvinism.  But recall that accepting chauvinism, recasting 
it in the language I’ve been using, here would leave us with the following dilemma: either 
a creature has L-concepts or that creature does not realize intentional mental states (and 
does not behave intentionally).  This is where concept splitting, coupled with degrees of 
intentionality, could provide an alternative approach.  I’ve suggested, albeit rudely, that if 
intentional states are so-called because they are ‘about’ things in the world, then 
intentional states structuring around L-concepts are richer and more highly compositional 
than intentional states structuring around only P-concepts.   
      I believe the argument for degrees of intentionality has the dual effect of offering a 
promising alternative to chauvinism (along with other all-or-nothing accounts of 
intentionality), while diffusing the worry that the ascription of intentionality in the 
absence of language might put us on a slippery slope resulting in the ascription of 
intentionality to the likes of earthworms and thermometers.  We can accept that 
earthworms, and perhaps even vervet monkeys, do not have beliefs and desires in the 
folk-psychological sense.  They do not have L-concepts.  We can also accept that 
intentional ascriptions of some form still apply in the case of vervets, but not in 
earthworms, because there is ample evidence that vervets realize the kinds of mental 
representations which structure around P-concepts while earthworms do not.  We should 
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not expect the matter of how to determine and describe the intentional content of P-
concepts to be resolved without appropriate empirical investigation. 
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